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policy.
9 By and large, however, these attempts have proven unsuccessful in an American employment system dominated by the employer-friendly employment-at-will doctrine. 10 In short, although many different forms of rights to association exist in the United States workplace, the actual coverage for workers is a patchwork of protections that apply sometimes and not others, depending largely on factors such as whether one works for a public or private employer and whether one is in a unionized or non-unionized work environment. The consequence of this state of affairs is that American workers may have fewer rights to association than many of their international counterparts in the industrialized world. 9 The Novoselcase provides an example where the court attempted to recognize a right to speech and association for a private employee, Novose/v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 Ezd 894 (3d Cir. 1983 ), but its ruling has since been implicitly overruled. See Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F2d 611 (3rd Cir. 1992) (retreating from Novosets interpretation of Pennsylvania's constitution); Paul v. Lankenau Hosp., 569 A.2d 346 (Pa. 199o) (disapproving of Novosels interpretation of the Pennsylvania Constitution).
Io Under the doctrine of employment-at-will, employers may terminate an employee for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all, as long as the reason is not illegal (e.g, under federal, state, or local antidiscrimination law). Similarly, the reciprocal right of the employee is the ability to leave employment without giving notice to their employer. This rule evolved from a treatise by H.G. Wood in 1877. Wood asserted:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof .... [An indefinite hiring.., is determinable at the will of either party .... in the industrialized world in having at its basic rule that workers can be fired for any reason without any notice").
H. G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER
I I One recalls here the criticism in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2oo6) , by Justice Souter in his dissent concerning federal and state whistle-blowing statutes in the United States:
[Sipeech addressing official wrongdoing may well fall outside protected whistle-blowing, defined in the classic sense of exposing an official's fault to a third party or to the public; the teacher in Givhan, for example, who raised the issue of unconstitutional hiring bias, would not have qualified as that sort of whistle-blower, for she was fired after a private conversation with the school principal. In any event, the combined variants of statutory whistle-blower definitions and protections add up to a patchwork, not a showing that worries may be remitted to legislatures for relief.
Id. at 1970 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979)).
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This article will reflect on some of the various workplace situations where rights to association are implicated and the problems of application that derive from these scenarios. Some of these examples involve situations where employees depend on rights to association to defend themselves against arbitrary employer action and overreaching, but other associational rights discussed below inhere in the employer and may be utilized to exclude unwanted employees from an employee organization, thereby undermining employees' rights to association further.
The solution seems to be for Congress to adopt a uniform federal law to protect the associational rights of all employees in the workplace. My project is therefore similar to the one undertaken by Justice Souter in dissent in Garcetti v. Ceballos 2 in the whistle-blowing/free speech context:
My point is not to disparage particular statutes .... but merely to show the current understanding of statutory protection: individuals doing the same sorts of governmental jobs and saying the same sorts of things addressed to civic concerns will get different protection depending on the local, state, or federal jurisdictions that happened to employ them.
3
To address these concerns, this article is divided into five parts based on the different types of associational rights in the labor and employment context. Part I discusses the use of the right to association to protect public employees from political discrimination and other forms of associational discrimination.' 4 Part II explores emerging intimate association rights to protect workers' sexual privacy from employer interference." Part III then turns the tables and considers how American employers may use the right of expressive association to exclude employees whose mere presence implies support for controversial or unpopular views. 6 Part IV then suggests a federal statute, the Freedom of Association in the Workplace Act (FAWA), which would better secure the basic freedom of association to all workers and make uniform this most fundamental of civil liberties.' Although the right to association is not found within the text of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution," such a right has nevertheless been implicitly found to be a fundamental constitutional right by the United States Supreme Court. 19 In short, this is because the ability to associate with others increases one's ability to engage in civil liberties protected by the Constitution.
0 In this regard, the Supreme Court has commented that an "individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed."
1
The actual scope of the right to association in the labor and employment context is based on the notion, sometimes referred to as the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, that a public employer may not take adverse employment action against a public employee on a basis that infringes his or her constitutional rights.
2 2 Thus, although many public employees continue to be at-will employees, 3 they cannot be terminated, demoted, transferred, or subjected to other adverse employment actions, for exercising their constitutional rights.
At one time in its history, the United States Supreme Court held that government benefits were mere privileges that could be withheld or limited on any condition. 4 The American jurist, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, famously wrote in the employment context that a person "may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional redress of grievances").
19 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) ("[W] e have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends"); see also NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) (labeling right to association as an indispensable part of liberty on the same plane as the rights to speech or press). 13 (1988) ("The ability and the opportunity to combine with others to advance one's view is a powerful practical means of ensuring the perpetuation of the freedoms the First Amendment has guaranteed to individuals as against the government").
21 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622. 22 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) . 23 However, a large number of public employees in the United States also have just cause protection under either a collective bargaining contract or civil service laws. For instance, as of 2oo6, 36.2% of public sector employees were union members. See Bureau of Labor Statistics of zoo6, supra note 7. Additionally, many federal civil service workers may only be terminated for cause that promotes the efficiency of the civil service. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (2007).
24 See, e.g., People v. Crane, io8 N.E. 427, 430 (Mass. 1892) ( Thus, the government "may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests--especially, his interest in freedom of speech." 30 As the Court observed in Perry: "For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited,"'" and "'produce a result which [it] Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) ("For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which government may not rely"); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,404 (1963) (in the unemployment compensation and free exercise of religion context stating that, "[it is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege"). 36 Justice O'Connor explained that a government employee's close relationship with the government requires a balancing of important free speech and government interests. 37 In such relationships, "[tihe government needs to be free to terminate both employees and contractors for poor performance, to improve the efficiency, efficacy, and responsiveness of service to the public, and to prevent the appearance of corruption.
' 38 Similarly, Justice 34 Id. at 568 (emphasis added); see also Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 94 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The restrictions that the Constitution places upon the government in its capacity as lawmaker, i.e., as the regulator of private conduct, are not the same as the restrictions it places upon the government in its capacity as employer"); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 356-357 n.13 (198o) ("A governmental employer may subject its employees to such special restrictions on free expression as are reasonably necessary to promote effective government"); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, io8 YALE L.J. 1225, 1250 (1999) ("[A] balancing approach that would not be used when the government acts as regulator is appropriate when the government acts as employer"). For an interesting conception of the different roles government play, see generally ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT (1995) (dividing the "social domain" into three parts: the domain of democracy and public discourse, the domain of management, and the domain of community).
35 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 66I, 671-72 ('994) (plurality opinion) ("We have never explicitly answered this question [about the government's dual roles,] though we have always assumed that its premise is correct-that the government as employer indeed has far broader powers than does the government as sovereign") (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,564 (1973) ); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 7 18 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("We have ... no one Free Speech Clause test. We have different tests for content-based speech restrictions, for content-neutral speech restrictions, for restrictions imposed by the government acting as employer, for restrictions in nonpublic fora, and so on"); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) ). See also Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Modelfor Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1497 (1999) ("Administrative efficiency is generally not considered a compelling interest under strict scrutiny, which may be one reason that free speech cases have explicitly adopted a more deferential standard for government-as-employer regulations, instead of purporting to apply strict scrutiny"). [T]he extra power the government has in this area comes from the nature of the government's mission as employer. Government agencies are charged by law with doing particular tasks. Agencies hire employees to help do those tasks as effectively and efficiently as possible. When someone who is paid a salary so that she will contribute to the agency's effective operation begins to do or say things that detract from the
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Powell explained in his concurring opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy that "the Government's interest, and hence the public's interest, is the maintenance of employee efficiency and discipline .... To this end, the Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and control over the management of its personnel and internal affairs."
' 39 Last, in her plurality decision in Waters v. Churchill, Justice O'Connor juxtaposed the two roles that government plays by describing certain First Amendment doctrines which could not be reasonably applied to speech of government employees, 4° and by outlining the less stringent procedural requirements for restrictions on government employees' speech. 41 This same line of reasoning generally applies to the greater authority public employers have in impinging upon public employees' associational claims.
Although it is generally agreed that the government has more power to interfere with constitutional rights in its employment capacity, 4 it is far from clear how to assess which employment practices are permissible and which are not.
43
In order to get to the bottom of this thorny question, agency's effective operation, the government employer must have some power to restrain her.
See also Tushnet, supra note 34, at 1250 ("The government has instrumental or programmatic goals within the domain of management. When acting there, it may restrict individual autonomy in the service of its programmatic goals") (citing C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. I, 16-21 (1998) ). Indeed, absent contractual, statutory or constitutional restriction, the government is entitled to terminate employees and contractors on an at-will basis, for good reason, bad reason, no reason at all. See Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674.
39 Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (I974) (Powell, J., concurring). If it were otherwise, Justice Powell explains, the government employer would not be able to remove inefficient and unsatisfactory workers quickly and the government's substantial interest in so doing would be frustrated without adequate justification. See id.
40 See Waters, 511 U.S. at 672 (plurality opinion) (reviewing a number of First Amendment doctrines that do not apply with the same force in the government as employer context, including instances in which the employer "may bar its employees from using Mr. Cohen's offensive utterance to members of the public or to the people with whom they work") (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 197 I)).
41 See id. at 673 (observing that although speech restrictions on private citizens must precisely define the speech they target, a government employer is permitted to prohibit its employees from acting "rude to customers," even though this restriction would be void for vagueness under traditional First Amendment jurisprudence); see also Volokh, supra note 35, at 1494-97.
42 See Waters, 511 U.S. at 673 (observing that the Court has "consistently given greater deference to government predictions of harm used to justify restriction of employee speech than to predictions of harm used to justify restrictions on the speech of the public at large").
43 the Court has adopted two specific legal analytical frameworks for First Amendment association cases in the workplace:" one for political affiliation cases and one for all other types of public employee associational claims.
A. Public Employee Political Association Protections
Notions of political discrimination in the public workplace derived initially from the Cold War era in a series of cases dealing with loyalty oaths. Loyalty oath cases derived from the fear of the spread of Communism after the Russian Revolution in 1917. During this time and thereafter, many laws were passed in the United States which sought to limit the ability of Communists or Communist sympathizers from gaining government employment and undermining the government. 4s In particular, numerous federal and state laws were passed prohibiting the holding of public employment by those who refused to swear that they had not had any connection with the Communist Party.
46 It was therefore inevitable that during the height of the Cold War with the Soviet Union in the 1950s that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions would find vitality in the freedom of association in the workplace cases. In these cases, the Court held that government workers were constitutionally protected from losing their jobs for refusing to take an oath or for refusing to sign a declaration about their political affiliation.4 For instance in Wieman v. Updegraff, 49 the Supreme Court held that government workers were constitutionally protected from losing their jobs for not acknowledged that 'such particularized balancing is difficult,' and this seems to be an understatement. From all we've seen of the lower court decisions, the test is essentially indeterminate in all but the easiest cases.") (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 15o).
44 ("There can be no dispute about the consequences visited upon a person excluded from public employment on disloyalty grounds. In the view of the community, the stain is a deep one; indeed, it has become a badge of infamy. Especially is this so in time of cold war and hot emotions when 'each man begins to eye his neighbor as a possible enemy"' (quoting Judge Learned Hand, Address at the 86th Convocation of the University of the State of New York (October 24, 1952) As loyalty oaths became less visible after the 1950s and 1960s, a second generation of unconstitutional conditions in association cases came to the legal forefront starting in the 1970s. Specifically, these cases dealt with the so-called "spoils system," or political patronage, 5 which rewards public employment based on loyalty to a given political party. In Elrodv. Burns, 6 for example, the plurality decision written by Justice Brennan found that Illinois public employees, who were non-confidential, nonpolicymaking employees, 5 7 could not be fired merely because of their partisan political affiliation." In this regard, Brennan stated: "[Platronage dismissals severely restrict political belief and association. Though there is a vital need for government efficiency and effectiveness, such dismissals are on balance not the least restrictive means for fostering that end."
59
Four years later, a majority of the court upheld the major premises of Elrod in Branti v. Finkel. 6 0 There, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, similarly noted that assistant public defenders were nonconfidential, nonpolicymaking officials whose employment could not be terminated 50 See id. at 192 ("We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory").
51 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (196o). 52 Id. at 485-86 ("It is not disputed that to compel a teacher to disclose every associational tie is to impair that teacher's right to free association, .. . a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society").
53 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 54 Id. at 609 (striking down New York law as overbroad because it barred public "employment both for association which legitimately may be proscribed and for association which may not be proscribed consistent with First Amendment rights"). 66 Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that its holding applied only to non-policymaking employees and that a government employer is still permitted to terminate policymaking workers for their political beliefs. At these higher levels, government decisionmakers are allowed to politically discriminate to ensure loyalty to the governing party's political agenda.
In short, many public employees are provided substantial protection in the workplace for their political associations.
B. Public Employee Workplace Association Protections
Whereas the cases discussed in the previous section protect government workers in their political affiliations, public workers are protected more generally from termination for engaging in associational activity counter 65 See id. at 74. 66 See id. at 78 ("Under our sustained precedent, conditioning hiring decisions on political belief and association plainly constitutes an unconstitutional condition, unless the government has a vital interest in doing so"). The Court also rejected that notion that these types of employment decisions should somehow be treat differently because they did not have the same impact on individual's First Amendment rights as an ultimate firing decision. See id. at 73 (finding that '[employees who find themselves in dead-end positions due to their political backgrounds are adversely affected") (emphasis in original).
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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL to their government employers' wishes. 67 The government employer in these cases, for its part, seeks to protect legitimate business interests in running an efficient workplace. Consequently, the strict scrutiny analysis applied to government employer actions in the political association cases is inappropriate. Instead, the question is one of government "reasonableness" under all the circumstances and courts engage in a balancing of the relevant employer and employee interests. 6 " Although the public employee First Amendment framework was initially established for free speech/free expression cases, a similar analysis applies to freedom of association claims. 69 For public employees to make out First Amendment retaliation claims based on their right to association, the reasonableness of the public employer response must go through at least a three-step analysis. 
1999). 70
There are two additional steps that may apply to the Pickering framework in the context of a public employee's associational claim. The Supreme Court gave the Pickering balancing test an important additional gloss in the speech case of Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138 (1983) . Connick requires that even before a Pickering balance can occur, a court had to consider as a threshold matter whether the public employee was speaking on "a matter of public concern." Id. at 15o. There is some dispute over whether an association claim must relate to a matter of public concern before the Pickering balance applies. " Here, much emphasis is placed on whether the employee's association causes a substantial disruption in the workplace. 73 Substantial disruption, in turn, is measured based on "the impact of the [conduct] on working relationships, the harm caused by the [conduct], the public's interest in the [conduct] , and the employee's relationship to that issue." 7 4 Paradoxically, this substantial disruption standard appears to make most vulnerable those associations which are the most unpopular and warrant the most protection under the First Amendment.
75 If the balance under Pickering favors the government, the public employee has no First Amendment rights in association.
Second, if the Picketing balance favors the employee, the employee is then considered to have engaged in protected activity. Next, under the evidentiary framework established in Mount Healthy City School District v. Doyle, 76 the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that engaging in the protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action that the employee suffered. 77 This showing may be based on both direct and circumstantial evidence that the most likely reason the employee lost their job, was demoted, etc., was because of the employee's associational activities.
Third, and finally, if the employee shows that the protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse employment decision, the Government then has the burden of persuasion to show that it would have made the same decision even in the absence of the protected conduct.
78
If the public employer is successful in meeting this burden, there is again no liability. This is because " [t] he constitutional principle at stake is 1213. The i i th Circuit concluded that Garcetti does apply to associational claims and requires that a public employee not be acting as an employee pursuant to official duties in order to have a First Amendment associational claim. Id. at 1213. This appears to be the first decision on the issue and therefore, it remains to be seen whether other courts follow the I Ith Circuit lead. Needless to say, the arrival of Garcetti further complicates this area of law. This complicated framework highlights the difficulties public employees have when they maintain that they were terminated from employment for engaging in protected, associational activities. Nevertheless, these types of associational rights are more secure then the developing rights to intimate association described below.
II. THE RIGHT TO INTIMATE ASSOCIATION IN THE WORKPLACE CONTEXT
Since Brandeis and Warren wrote their famous article in 1890 about privacy rights, 8 1 the only thing that commentators have seemed to agree on concerning the right to privacy is that there is very little agreement about its contours."
2 But privacy rights developed under the substantive due process component of the liberty interest in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 83 also overlap with the right to association. More specifically, the Supreme Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees" recognized a right to intimate association. The most important constitutional innovation wrought by this holding is the apparent attachment of some form of heightened scrutiny to the right to be free from decisional interference in matters of an intimate nature. Indeed, implicit in this holding is the need to balance individual privacy interests against legitimate and substantial state interests.
93
Utilizing the Pickering framework for these types of intimate associational claims in the workplace,' I have developed a new framework for balancing the employee's right as citizen to be free from unwanted and unjustified governmental intrusions in the employee's personal and private life against the government's interest as employer to run an efficient governmental service for the benefit of the public.
9 5 At times, this balance will obviously be strongly in favor of either the government or the employee, depending on whether the employee's off-duty, private conduct has any impact on the employer. If there is no impact, there is no "work-relatedness," 9 6 and the ) ("While that outer limit is a bit further from the workplace than one might have expected, at some point along the spectrum of work-relatedness, the public employee apparently escapes the Connick-Pickering niche and recovers
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For more intricate intimate association cases, it is helpful to consider the "nexus test" used for employee discharges by labor arbitrators in the union environment." The general principle is that an employer should not be able to interfere with an employee's life outside of work unless there is more than a de minimis adverse impact on the employer's work place.
98 This impact can be measured based on the detriment to the employer's public image, the inability of the worker to interact with his or her co-employees, or the simple inability of the employee to carry out the essential functions of his or her position as a result of the private conduct. 99 But outside of these types of legitimate and substantial justifications for interference in an employee's private life, a government employer should be constrained by the liberty interest contained in the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from interfering with the rights of intimate association of their employees.
Although this intimate association right has not been widely utilized by courts in the United States, there are some encouraging signs. In a recent state court case from North Carolina, a female sheriff dispatcher, Debora Hobbs, was told by her supervising sheriff, Carson Smith, to marry her live-in boyfriend, move out, or lose her job.10° The sheriff based his actions on a state anti-cohabitation statute from 1805 and, in fact, the female dispatcher lost her position when she refused to comply. So, in addition to the more generic right to association found within the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, there are additional sources of associational protections found under Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process. In other words, there is a further layer of analysis for both public employers to think about when making workplace decisions potentially unrelated to the workplace and for employees to consider when shielding themselves from their public employer's overreaching.
Yet, there is a further complication caused by the recent development of an aggressive expansion of expressive association rights for organizations, including public and private employers. It is that subject that this article now considers in its various dimensions.
III. THE RIGHT TO EXPRESSIVE AssocIATION
IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
The landmark case of Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 1 0 6 not only introduced the conception of intimate association, but it broke new ground in freedom of association cases by introducing an instructive dichotomy. In Roberts, Justice Brennan divided all previous constitutional association cases into two categories. On the one hand, the right to intimate association, which concerns rights to personal liberty located within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 07 On the other hand, the right to expressive association, which involves association for the promotion of rights found primarily within the First Amendment. 1°8 The nature and degree of constitutional protection depends for what purpose the organization engages in associational activities. 1 0 In Roberts, the state interference at issue involved the application of Minnesota's state public accommodations statute's gender discrimination provisions to the membership policies of the Jaycees, which did not grant 
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women full membership in their organization."' The Court first explained that the Jaycees was not an intimate association because of its size, lack of selectivity in defining group membership, and its generally open, public nature."' Having eliminated intimate association from consideration, the Court recognized the Jaycees as a type of expressive association whose members affiliated with one another to advocate certain views."'
In this regard, the Court stated, "we have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.", 3 The Court went on to conclude that "[in view of the various protected activities in which the Jaycees engages ... that right is plainly implicated in this case."' 14 Jaycees' activities are described later in the opinion as taking public positions on a number of diverse issues and regularly engaging "in a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other activities worthy of constitutional protection under the First Amendment."" ' Some sixteen years later, a newly constituted Supreme Court had the opportunity to develop further the expressive association doctrine in the form of Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale,' 16 in which the Court found in favor of IIO Id. at 612-17. i Id I. at 620-2 i. Not surprisingly, the Court also found employers do not have rights of intimate association when selecting employees. See id. at 620 ("[Tlhe Constitution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the State's power to control the selection of one's spouse that would not apply to regulations affecting the choice of one's fellow employees").
112 Id. at 622. Even though the Court concluded that the Jaycees had expressive association rights and those rights were significantly burdened by the application of the public accommodation statute, the Court nevertheless held that the State's compelling interest in eradicating gender discrimination justified the infringement on the group's rights. Id at
622-23.
113 Id. at 622. 114 Id. 115 Id. at 626-27. Contrary to Justice Brennan's dichotomy, Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Roberts suggests that non-intimate association cases should be further broken down into expressive association and commercial association cases to accord sufficient protection to expressive associations, while at the same time placing appropriate burdens on groups claiming the protection of the First Amendment for commercial association purposes. Id. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Whereas those associations that were predominantly expressive were due substantial protection from governmental interference, O'Connor argued that commercial associations were largely non-expressive and, therefore, state regulation was permissible as long as it was rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Id. at 633-35. Nevertheless, O'Connor does recognize that " [m] any associations cannot readily be described as purely expressive or purely commercial" and that "[t]he standard for deciding just how much of an association's involvement in commercial activity is enough to suspend the association's First Amendment right to control its membership cannot... be articulated with simple precision." Id. at 635.
